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   The relationships among sovereign nations throughout the world are guided, to a large 
extent, by diplomatic exchanges and negotiations. Likewise, the functioning of international 
organizations is based, in part, on negotiations among their constituent elements or members. 
All these interactions can be chaotic, however, leading to frequent, serious conflicts and war. 
Or, they can take place in a structured and peaceful manner, guided by a set of agreed 
principles. This latter state of affairs might be called a "world order". 
   Since the end of the Cold War, new possibilities have opened up for the evolution of a 
world order that is quite different from the largely bipolar structure of the 1948-1988 period, 
an order perhaps resembling the European "concert of nations" between 1812 and 1914. A 
more intensive flow of international interactions began even before the end of the Cold War, 
in part driven by new communications technologies and global trade and finance. Since 1990, 
this "globalization" is progressing in several fields: (1) trade, finance, and other economic 
activities; (2) government-to-government political relations; (3) information and culture; and 
(4) security cooperation for military defense, as well as for domestic security, such as crime 
and terrorism. 
   Today, there is a great deal of interest in this evolving world order and its various 
international structures. Some of these structures are still emerging (e.g. the World Trade 
Organization under GATT), others are expanding their functions (e.g. the United Nations). 
Discussions and negotiations are going on about an increased role for the United Nations, 
about the scope of the a World Trade Organization set up under GATT, and about various 
global arms control organizations. To construct these organizations and to run them requires 
frequent negotiation. This paper is focussed on the question whether these global negotiations 
follow certain traditions in tactics and style, or to put it differently, whether there is a 
globally accepted "grammar of negotiation" that is adhered to in international organizations. 
   Worldwide organizations have existed for a long time. In a sense, the British, Spanish, 
and Portuguese empires were worldwide organizations. In a different sense, the Roman 
Catholic church has long been a worldwide organization. But these are hierarchical 
organizations, with a single central authority at the top. Worldwide organizations that include 
many members who share power and control among each other have developed later. One of 
the first worldwide functional organizations for all of the world's sovereign nations was the 
Universal Postal Union, founded in 1874. Today, there exist some 20 worldwide international 
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organizations, most of which have some kind of affiliation with the United Nations 
Organization. 
   Each of these organizations has its established voting rights, its executive and 
supervisory bodies, and its rules - formal and informal - for conducting its business. The 
functioning of the United Nations is guided by the UN Charter, which has many provisions 
similar to those of a constitution in a federation. Yet, the United Nations lacks many of the 
elements and structures of a government of a federal state (such as Canada or Malaysia). For 
instance, the United Nations does not have an integral judiciary system, since the 
International Court does not function as the highest court of the United Nations Organization 
and does not have lower level courts subordinated to it. The European Union comes closest 
'to the structure of a federal state and, according to some speculations, might eventually 
become a federal state that can project a single, integrated sovereignty onto the world arena. 
   Since all the worldwide international organizations consist of a collection of sovereign 
states, nearly all their decisions depend on a process of negotiation in contrast to the 
decisions of democratic national governments. But this difference is one of degree, because 
democratic states (whether with a unitary or a federal constitution) also depend on 
negotiations to reach decisions requiring the support of their various formal and informal 
components that posses some political power. The Japanese Prime Minister, for example, has 
to negotiate with influential people in his own party, with other parties represented in the 
parliament, and perhaps with business, professional and other organizations in order to arrive 
at effective policy decisions. Likewise, the President of the United States has to bargain with 
Congress and various power structures throughout the country. Thus, one might say, modern 
international organizations, such as the European Union or the United Nations Organization, 
are like a greatly weakened version of a modern democracy. That is to say, most of the day-to-
day and year-to-year decisions and policy choices are neither fully determined by the 
constitution (or the charter), nor can they be simply imposed by the chief executive. 
   In the 19th century, the great French historian Ernest Renan observed that the modern 
nation of his time was based on a "daily referendum" by all the citizens - "un plebiscite de 
tous les jours." This famous phrase of Renan evokes the fundamental strength of direct 
democracies (i.e. democracies where not just the people's representatives vote on issues, but 
the people themselves cast these votes). Could this idea be extended beyond the nation-state, 
to shape and sustain a global international order? The United States promoted the idea that 
the people of the world - not merely the governments had a role in shaping and guiding 
the United Nations. The preamble of the UN Charter begins with the words "we the peoples of 
the United Nations", a phrase that recalls the opening words of the American Constitution. 
Not surprisingly, it was the United States delegation that proposed this wording when the UN 
Charter was drafted. 
    The fact is that people, apart from their governments, do have some influence on the 
decisions of global inter-governmental organization. The 1994 UN conference on population 
in Cairo has demonstrated that, so did the 1992 UN conference on the environment in Rio.
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Various non-governmental organizations, private groups and associations can modify the ideas 
that the official governmental organization has to address and can have an impact on the 
formulation of proposals. These internationally active, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) have experienced a remarkable growth in the last couple of decades.1 
   Private citizens thus can have some influence on the negotiating process in international 
organizations, especially if they are well organized, forming international associations that 
influence media opinion or lobby their own governments. In essence, they can modify the 
goals, expectations, and ambitions of the official government negotiators. They can paint the 
picture of what a successful outcome would look like and what would be a failure. 
   If we wish to understand how private organizations or the media can influence 
international negotiations, we need to recognize that the criteria for evaluating a proposed 
agreement are usually fluid. A proposed settlement that initially looks attractive, later on may 
look like a bad deal because of media criticism. A proposed set of guidelines for global trade 
may seem "fair" at first, but become "unacceptable" after public opinion leaders or pressure 
groups have succeeded in changing the criteria of evaluation. 
   Indeed, one of the main purposes of a negotiating strategy is to alter the criteria by which 
a proposed agreement will be evaluated. Each party in a negotiation seeks to influence this 
process to support its own preferences.2 One hears complaints sometimes in international 
organizations that the United States enjoys an advantage because of a widespread American 
influence over the world media. There is some truth to this. 
   During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was engaged in continuing propaganda efforts to 
strengthen its own bargaining position. Much of the Soviet propaganda has been highly 
skillful. Historians have since been able to document cases where the Soviet negotiating 
position has benefitted significantly from these efforts to shape public opinion in the West. 
By contrast, the actual negotiating tactics of the Soviet government, as distinct from the 
Soviet propaganda, have been rather clumsy and often unsuccessful. Other nations, of course, 
also seek to strength their negotiating position by influencing public opinion. In the United 
States, some people have argued that the Japanese government and large Japanese 
corporations are financing all sorts of projects to influence American public and 
Congressional opinion about trade disputes. 
   Instead of cultivating goodwill with the public, negotiators may seek to intimidate the 
opponent. Communist dictators and their diplomats have often resorted to rudeness and 
vitriolic attacks. Usually, this tactic has been self-defeating because it strengthened the 
animosity and cohesion of the West. Occasionally, this aggressive rudeness may have served 
to intimidate foreign adversaries of Lenin, Stalin, or Mao; but its main purpose probably was 
to create fear among their own diplomats so that they would resist temptations to make 
concessions to the West. 
   By and large, the Communist style of negotiation has not been particularly skillful3. The 
Communist fear of making concession has lead to a brittle approach, making Communist 
diplomats incapable of taking advantage of partial gains because the felt compelled to insist
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on their full demands. The more dictatorial a regime, the more dangerous it is for its 
diplomats to recommend concessions and thus appear weak, or even disloyal. On the other 
hand, Communist dictators themselves have demonstrated an ability to make bold strategic 
concessions in order to save more important objectives. Stalin suddenly ended his blockade of 
Berlin when he became convinced he could not win. And Lenin, in the Brest-Litovsk 
negotiations, gave up half of Russia to save his Bolshevik regime. 
   Today, the norm for all diplomatic activity in international organizations is to avoid 
personal rudeness, to be "business like", and by and large to avoid explicit threats of violence. 
This norm, of course, is sometimes ignored. It has its parallel in the traditions of well 
established parliaments: there can be vigorous debate, sharp political attacks, hard criticism, 
but almost always everyone will adhere to certain standards of politeness and mutual respect 
- or at least a pretense of mutual respect. Perhaps this tradition was first developed in the 
British parliament and then followed in the US Congress and other parliaments. 
   More important than differences in style and standards of politeness are the formal and 
informal rules of parliamentary procedure. To function properly, an international organization 
needs complex rules of procedures (as do national parliaments): rules for voting, procedures 
establishing the relationship of committees to the plenary body, rules for the movement of 
procedural and substantive decisions through the different "chambers" (that is to say, in the 
U.N. for example, the flow of business between the Security Council, various committees, and 
the General Assembly). Unless the leading powers (or a powerful majority) in the organization 
is willing to follow these rules, the organization simply cannot function. 
   During the height of the Cold War, the United Nations was unable because of the Soviet 
veto to make decisions on many issues where East and West disagreed; yet it continued to 
function more or less according to its Charter and rules, because a majority of the members, 
and in particular the United States, wanted to preserve the UN, and the Soviet Union did not 
want to be expelled or withdraw completely. By contract, the government structure and 
parliament of former Yugoslavia did not survive the emerging open conflict between Serbs 
and Croats, even though the Yugoslav constitution had provided for a sharing of power among 
different ethnic groups and might have accommodated the divergent preferences of these 
groups. 
   Under what conditions can an international organization survive intense conflict, or even 
wars, among its members? The answer to this question is important for the future world order: 
   An international organization can survive intense conflict, or even wars, among some of its 
   members, provided: 
  (1) The members who want the organization to survive control a preponderance of the 
    political power and the majority voting strength; and 
  (2) The members who would prefer to transform the organization into a tool of their own 
    policy, or wish to wreck the organization, can 
      (a) either be expelled (or be allowed to leave the organization), without fatally 
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       damaging it, or 
     (b) remain interested in preserving their membership. 
   Although the above rule sounds a bit complicated, it fits a number of significant cases. 
The League of Nations survived the withdrawal of Germany, Japan, and Italy in the 1930s, 
but became moribund when in 1939 the Soviet Union was also expelled. The United Nations 
survived the Soviet boycott of the Security Council during the beginning of the Korean War 
in 1950, in fact the initial UN decisions against the North Korean aggression were greatly 
facilitated by the temporary Soviet withdrawal. The UN survived this crisis as a global 
organization because the Soviet Union remained sufficiently interested in preserving its UN 
membership (see point 2(b) in the above rule). 
   Looking toward the future, we want to explore how today's political and cultural 
differences might effect the negotiation process in global organizations of an emerging world 
order. The British-American tradition of parliamentary procedures has clearly exerted a strong 
influence on the structure and procedures of the United Nations and nearly all other 
international organizations. These European ideas of governmental procedures and democratic 
structures can be traced back to the 18th century, prior to the American and French 
revolutions. By today, it seems these concepts have become internationalized and are no 
longer seen as being linked to one culture or civilization. 
   Some observers have asserted that cultural differences in negotiating styles are 
significant. Should we expect, therefore, that there might be contradictions and conflicts 
between, say, a Chinese, or an Arab, or an African style of running international 
organizations? For a democratically run international organization that is to say an 
organization based on democratic principles of consensus (or majority voting) and adherence 
to legal rules - such cultural differences are unimportant. The democratic rules and 
procedures everywhere are too similar. Totalitarian regimes (e.g. North Korea), however, 
continue to follow different concepts in their conduct of negotiations. 
   There is a parallel here with the principles of a free market economy. Different countries, 
belonging to different civilizations, can have more or less of a free market and will arrange 
the details of ownership, monetary policy, interest payments, private contracts, monopolies, 
etc. differently. Yet, the basic laws of supply and demand and other economic principles seem 
to operate everywhere - unless repressed by Marxist intervention. For example, 
fundamentalist Islamic countries cannot avoid interest payments on loans, they can merely 
seek to disguise them. Indeed, a global culture prevails now for the conduct of economic 
transactions and for international business negotiations. 
    Thus, while cultural differences have rather little influence on the structure and 
procedures of international organizations (especially in the economic sphere), they do of 
course strongly influence the preferences about the substance of the policies that these 
organizations deliberate and vote on. This becomes clear with such issues as rights of women, 
labor codes, freedom or restrictions of the press, or acceptance of immigration. For instance, 
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many of the countries that experience large emigration and that demand that their citizens be 
allowed to emigrate into other countries themselves practice very restrictive policies for in-
migration into their own territory. The Mexican government, for example, wants its citizens 
easily to be able to emigrate to the United States, but makes in-migration into Mexico very 
difficult. 
   An issue of fundamental importance for the future of international organizations is the 
varying emphasis on equality, and how equality is to be defined. Consider the situation in the 
United Nations. There is the inequality of the unequal voting rights in the Security Council, 
and then there is the sense of inequality as a result of equal voting rights in nearly all other 
UN organs for nations of very unequal size: one vote for China and one vote for St. Vincent 
or Iceland. So far we have witnessed little agitation for weighted voting rights that would 
give some weight to population. But if the world becomes more integrated economically and 
more closely linked through information networks, a sense of under-representation may arise 
in the most populous countries. The members of the European Union have painfully 
negotiated a weighted voting system that takes partially account of population size. 
   These issues lead to broader, more philosophic questions of equality. The emphasis on 
the rights of each individual person, and on equality among individuals, is historically a 
European idea. According to some interpretations, it is linked to the concepts of man in 
Christianity. In the coming evolution of global organizations, how much emphasis will be 
given to the equality of all individual human beings, as distinct from the equality of all 
sovereign states? Will different cultures or civilizations in the world promote different 
concepts for equality? 
   We can see two possibilities for the future world order. One is the continuing emphasis 
on equality of nations (or sovereign states), with some corrective weighing formula for the 
more powerful states (as now exist in the UN Security Council, the World Bank, and other 
bodies.) The other possibility is an increasing emphasis on the individual citizen, including 
perhaps systems of representation analogous to the lower chamber of parliaments in federal 
states (such as the US House of Representatives). The trouble with that formula is that it will 
not only be resisted by the less populous states, which collectively now have voting 
majorities in most UN bodies; but it may also been seen as undesirable by some government 
leaders of the very populous states because it might dilute their power. Given this complex 
dynamic, it will take a long time for the evolving world order to reach a new compromise 
between an equal role for all unequal nations, and an equal role for all the people. 
   Finally, there is the most crucial question to be solved - the question of enforcement. If 
major conflicts arise in any kind of an agreed international order, one or another party may 
ultimately use military force to achieve its objectives. Also, every arms control regime raises 
the question of violations and what is to be done about them. Monitoring and inspections are 
necessary, but not sufficient conditions to prevent, or correct, violations. In today's world, 
only nation states poses the ability to mobilize, command, and deploy effective military 
forces, either by themselves or in a coalition. The ability of the United Nations to act 
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militarily depends on the willingness and ability of 
military action and to order their national forces to 
future, it is not realistic to postulate a UN military 
support of several major nation states.
the major powers to 
support such action. 
capability that does
agree on a certain 
For the foreseeable 
not depend on the
Notes
1 Nearly a thousand NGOs now have consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council; 
  14,500 international NGOs are recognized by the Union of International Organizations. See Peter J. 
  Spiro, "New Global Communities: Non-governmental Organizations in International Decision-Making 
  Institutions," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995 (Vol. 18, number 1) pp. 45-56. 
2 I have developed this point previously. See my How Nations Negotiate (Harper & Row, New York, 
  1964, and Kraus Reprint, Millwood, NY) Chapter 10. 
3 Ibid pp. 226-235.
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